Human Population Dynamics Revisited with the Logistic Model: How Much Can Be Modeled and Predicted? by Marchetti, C. et al.
HUMAN POPULATION DYNAMICS REVISITED WITH 
THE LOGISTIC MODEL: HOW MUCH CAN BE 
MODELED AND PREDICTED? 
Cesare Marchetti 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Perrin S. Meyer and Jesse H. Ausubel 
Program for the Human Environment 
Rockefeller University, New York, USA 
RR-96-14 
September 1996 
Reprinted from Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
Volume 52, pp. 1-30 (1996). 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed 
before publication. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those 
of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the 
work. 
Reprinted with permission from Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
Volume 52, pp. 1-30 (1996). 
Copyright @1996 Elsevier Science Inc. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any 
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright 
holder. 
Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria. 
Foreword 
In recent years there has been great interest in projecting the future size and 
distribution of the world's population. There are significant uncertainties 
involved in making such projections, as assumptions must be made about 
fertility, mortality, and migration rates. This paper applies the logistic model 
to fertility, life expectancy, and aggregate human numbers to explore the 
extent to which population dynamics can be modeled and predicted. In 
doing so, the paper also presents interesting historical material to which the 
logistic curve appears to fit well . 
The authors, C. Marchetti, part-time IIASA Guest Scholar, J.H. Ausubel 
of Rockefeller University, an IIASA alumnus and frequent participant in 
IIASA activities, and P.S. Meyer ~of Rockefeller University, are not part 
of IIASA's Population, Development, and Environment Project, which has 
gained an international reputation for projections of world population based 
on a methodology quite different from the one discussed here. By reprinting 
this paper, IIASA hopes to stimulate scientific discussion. A plurality of ap-
proaches provides valuable insights, especially in research areas where there 
are so many uncertainties, and is therefore always welcome. 
lll 
Peter E. de J dnosi 
Director 
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Human Population Dynamics Revisited with 
the Logistic Model: How Much Can 
Be Modeled and Predicted? 
CESARE MARCHETTI, PERRIN S. MEYER, and JESSE H. AUSUBEL 
ABSTRACT 
Decrease or growth of population comes from the interplay of death and birth (and locally, migration) . 
We revive the logistic model, which was tested and found wanting in early-20th-century studies of aggregate 
human populations, and apply it instead to life expectancy (death) and fertility (birth), the key factors totaling 
population. For death, once an individual has legally entered society, the logistic portrays the situation crisply. 
Human life expectancy is reaching the culmination of a two-hundred year-process that forestalls death until 
about 80 for men and the mid-80's for women. No breakthroughs in longevity are in sight unless genetic engineering 
comes to help. For birth, the logistic covers quantitatively its actual morphology. However, because we have 
not been able to model this essential param~ter in a predictive way over long periods, we cannot say whether 
the future of human population is runaway growth or slow implosion. Thus, we revisit the logistic analysis of 
aggregate human numbers. From a n;che point of view, resources are the limits to numbers, and access to 
resources depends on technologies . The logistic makes clear that for homo Jaber, the limits to numbers keep 
shifting. These moving edges may most confound forecasting the long-run size of humanity . 
Introduction: Runaway Growth or Slow Implosion? 
As Charles Darwin said, in the struggle for life number gives the best insurance to 
win [l]. The Bible (Genesis 22:17) records that when God wanted to boost the elected 
ones, he promised that they would become more numerous than the grains of sand on 
the sea shore (i.e., >>1012). 
In fact, world population since the mid 20th century has grown by about 20Jo per 
year, a rate that doubles the population in roughly 35 years. Actual data fitted over five 
centuries with reasonable equations show that the secular rate of growth kept increasing 
until around 1970, leading, at least from a mathematical point of view, to an infinite 
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Fig. 1. World population growth, 10,000 e.c. to present. Sources of data: McEvedy and Jones (2) 
ilnd United Nations [25). 
population in a finite time (Figure 1). (See [2] for a numerical history and [3] for an 
infinite prediction.) Such growth worries environmentalists and many others and leads 
to a first question: Where is the world population moving? 
,.. A second worry occupies rich, mostly white populations, in particular Europeans. 
The anxiety of their politicians and demographers (and the Pope) roots in the fact that 
on average a European woman now bears only about 1.4 children along her fertile span. 
To preserve a population, the rate should be around 2.1. The gap means that European 
populations are slowly imploding. An "oldies" boom preserves numbers for a while but 
empties society of the vis vita/is, the vital force carried by youth. Thus, a second question: 
Where is the population of the advanced industrialized nations moving? 1 
Two mechanisms control the size of a population: life expectancy at various ages 
and the fertility rate. (Migration also affects the size of local populations, but we will 
not consider it here.) For both death and birth, demographers still are searching for 
working models, that is, numerical models corresponding to theory whose parameters 
are set by independent data and whose results pass the test of conforming to still other 
data. (See [5] for a classic introduction to demography; [6] for a severe critique of progress 
a decade later; and [7, 8] for the current state of affairs.) The absence of working models 
means that the demographers cannot forecast the evolution of either life expectancy or 
fertility. Lee and Tuljapurkar, for example, state: "Doubtless the most important source 
of error in population forecasts is uncertainty about future [fertility] rates, because these 
rates are changing over time in ways that so far have been difficult to predict or even to 
explain after the fact"[9]. Thus, population predictions are based on numerical assump-
tions, or guesses, or "scenarios."2 
' Such fear dates back to the 1930s [4] . 
' For example, Lee and Tuljapurkar [9] assume that the U.S. fertility rate will converge to 2.1, the replacement 
level: "Conventional time series models for fertility can lead to unrealistic forecasts (including negative fertilities), 
so we examined two alternative models that incorporate prior information .... In both alternatives we constrain 
the models so that they yield a prescribed ultimate average value of the total fertility rate . We used a mean of 
2.1, chosen in part because it is close to the ultimate level of the 1992 Census projection and in part because 
many demographers view such an assumption as appropriate ." 
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So far, demographic predictions tend to diverge from the real numbers after about 
20 years. To give some examples, in 1951 the Population Division of the United Nations 
(UN) estimated that the world population in 1980 [10) would be between 2.976 and 3.636 
x 109• The use of four significant figures for a scenario is certainly worth a note. The 
number in 1980 was actually 4.45 x 1D9. In 1986 the UN predicted 6 x 109 for the year 
2000. The 1995 world population is 5.7 x 109• The UN mark will probably be reached 
in 1997. The UN 1992 prediction for 2150 is a la carte [ 11 I. One can choose seven different 
world population levels placed between 4.299 x 109 and 694.213 x 109 • However, the 
preference is for 11.543 x 109 • Unabated is the love for significant figures. 
Predictions are always made with ifs. Because everybody seems scared by increasing 
human populations, fertility values are tamed in such a way -as to produce a maximum 
psychologically acceptable number of humans, usually between 1010 and 2 x 10io by 
2100. The reckoning date is well beyond the life expectancy of present politicians and 
demographers . These soothing predictions are obviously based on the if that current total 
fertility rates will fall everywhere to the conservation value of 2.1 (see Figure 6, later) . 
As in weather forecasting, building the analysis from the bottom up becomes more and 
more complicated when one details to regions (and social status), and forecast results 
are not better. 
Suffice it to say that the problem of the future size of humanity is unsolved. Whether 
the answer is unknown or unknowable, the problem partly lies in the methods, and no 
sign of breakthrough has appeared in the literature. Our response is to go back to the 
numbers and have a fresh look. We seek quantitative regularities to see whether it is 
possible to forecast with some internal logic where and when the growth will stop. 
For both mortality and fertility all the mechanisms involved are regulatory and require 
social and cultural intervention. Because changes in culture and social behavior can be 
described by diffusive processes, basically captured in logistic equations (or their deriva-
tives or sums), our fresh look will refilter the numbers along these lines. The fact that 
we can model with good precision over long periods several parameters usually looked 
at in charts in a qualitative way will show the strength of our method. 
The use of the logistic model is widely established in many fields of modeling and 
forecasting [ 12, 13). It has a controversial history in population ecology, a point to which 
we return near the end of this article . One of a family of density-dependent functions, 
the logistic law of growth assumes simply that systeplS grow exponentially under the 
constraints of an upper limit producing a typical S-shaped curve [ 14). The three parameters 
of the logistic curve, which recur in our figures, are characteristic duration l:!..t, the limit 
K, and the midpoint lm . The characteristic duration Mis the time needed for the curve 
to grow from 10% to 90% of the limit K. Appendix l offers a mathematical description 
of the logistic model. 
There is obvious need for demographic statistics of reasonable quality and consistent 
definitions. See [2, 11, 15-28) for data sources. We also offer precise definitions of terms 
in the Glossary, Appendix 2. Shortcomings arise in several ways. For example, although 
local demographic registrations are of ancient origin and reliable, their patching up into 
national statistics may not be. African states may have made written records only recently. 
Changing cultural values affect what is recorded. Years for which detailed survey data 
are available are few and do not include all countries. In Appendix 3 we give some 
quantitative examples of the uncertainty associated, even in the present day, with fertility 
rates. Nevertheless, we believe that the long-run and comparative nature of our approach 
makes the analyses robust. 
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Our plan is to look first from the bottom up, using the logistic to model life expectancy 
and then, in much greater detail, fertility. When cases are intractable analytically, as 
modeling human population has been, the alternative is to look from the top down with 
phenomenological insights. The master case is that of thermodynamics, where a couple 
of well-centered axioms permitted almost two centuries ago the construction of a branch 
of physics unchallenged to date. Its analytical counterpart, statistical mechanics, took 
a full century to develop. In the case of demography, analysis of the aggregate behavior 
or niche started for animal populations in the mid-1800s . Before concluding, we briefly 
reapply the logistic model to the analysis of aggregate human populations with the help 
of some extra hindsight. 
Modeling Life Expectancy 
Life expectancy is an important parameter in defining the size of a population because 
for a given birth rate the number of people is proportional to it. 
Life expectancy in the developed world started changing in about 1800, improving 
slowly. The maximum gains have been in reducing infant mortality, but octogenarians 
also gained a few years. Demographers and medical doctors still struggle to define the 
future of the process. A simple solution can be found by assuming that each of us is 
endowed with longevity by DNA. Dangers along the way impede reaching the final age. 
However, by removing the dangers through nutrition, hygiene, medicine, and various 
coatings and protections, finally one can reach an age corresponding to longevity. 
,,. Because the removal of the dangers is a process of social learning, the equation most 
apt to describe it is a logistic (29] . For a time, knowledge and experience enable people 
to gain years of life with increasing speech Then the process slows as we near the limits 
of efficacy of our various strategies. In fact, evolution of life expectancy during the last 
two centuries can be precisely mapped using logistics . In Norway the gain in life expectancy 
at birth forms a neat logistic taking off at the 1 O?o level in 1810 and eventually adding 
39 years to the life of the new-born Norwegian child (Figure 2) . The process is logistic at 
each age, with 20-year-olds eventually gaining 20 years, 50-year-olds 11, and 80-year-olds 3 
(Figure 3). In fact, one can also map with a logistic the final gain versus age, as we have 
done for the Dutch population (Figure 4). 
All such analyses show that in developed countries we are near a limit (30] . Barring 
genetically engineered defense against senescence, life expectancy for women will stay 
in the mid-80s and for men about 5 years less. 3 Consequently, the effect of increasing 
life expectancy on population, which for a while has masked the decrease in fertility in 
some rich countries, will disappear. 
For developing countries we have not attempted to analyze comparable trends be-
cause the series of credible population statistics are not long enough. We would expect 
similar results. The basic processes of social development are the same, though perhaps 
operating more rapidly than they did for the countries that industrialized early. In devel-
oping countries, increase in life expectancy will sum up quickly, boosting the size of their 
populations on top of the effect of fertility. 
In the long term, life expectancy acts as a fixed multiplier on population and is thus 
much less important than fertility, which acts exponentially. 
Modeling fertility 
Reproduction is at the center of life. As Manfred Eigen showed in his seminal papers 
30 years ago, survival is the axiom from which the mathematics of life can be deduced 
' See also the following article in this issue by Marchetti for additional examples and details. 
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Fig. 2. Increase in life expectancy at birth, Norway, 1840-1990. A logistic curve fits the increase in 
life expectancy at birth. The logistic curve is displaced by 45 years, the life expectancy in 1845. As in 
most figures in this article, the logistic curve is plotted in both the traditional S-shaped form and in the 
Fisher-Pry transform. See Appendixes 1 and 2 for a description of the three parameters of the logistic 
model. Sources of data: United Nations (24) and Flora (16). 
[31). But survival in an abra~ve context means starting again and again, i.e., reproduction. 
Being central to survival, reproduction naturally also occupies a central place in the 
thinking and action of human societies. However, species are normally endowed with 
excessive reproductive capacity to take care of critical transients and occasional opportuni-
ties. Where survival rates are high, as in birds of prey who have few natural enemies, 
total fertility tends to be low. A chick every year or two for each female can suffice. 
Animals with lots of hungry enemies and poor defenses, such as snails, tend to astronomi-
cal prolificity. 
These generic observations may have trickled down into the concept that in humans 
the transition to lower mortality will lead to a fertility transition to replacement levels. 
Visual observation of mortality and natality curves for many nations shows in fact that 
both fall starting in the latter part of the 19th century (as shown for Finland in Figure 
5). The reported decrease in mortality typically precedes that of fertility . 
The post hoc propter hoc is necessary, but rarely sufficient, to determine a causal 
relationship. The two phenomena can descend from the same cause. To give a whimsical 
but not impossible mechanism, eating peanut butter could increase health and inhibit 
fertility. The phenomena could also be completely unrelated. A famous chart shows the 
decreasing number of storks flying to Germany during the last 30 years, closely matching 
the number of children born, by a constant multiplicative factor. 
Certainly decreasing the mortality of infants and the young before reproductive age 
reduces the need to produce many offspring. But the human species is endowed with 
excess fertility that had to be, and was, pruned even before the decrease in mortality 
that came after 1800, to fix a round reference date. 
A free-wheeling human female can produce a dozen or more children during her 
fertile period. Although this number was fairly frequently reached in agricultural families 
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up to 1900, most families stopped at much lower levels, say 4 children born. This essential 
fact means that fertility was always under control, helped in case of necessity by infanti-
cide, a practice widely used up to our days [32]. In Western countries infanticide is mostly 
substituted by abortion, which is the same act at a different time. Because fertility has 
always been under control, we must ask then why people stop at one number instead of 
another and, whether the choice, probably made without explicit reasoning, can neverthe-
less be rationalized . 
Some years ago a striking attempt at rationalization was made for India. It was 
observed that India had a mortality transition, but did not seem to have a marked fertility 
transition. The mean number of children per family hovers around four. The rationale 
was that females in India usually do not hold stable paid jobs. The male provides cash 
for the family. Simple calculation shows that to have at any time at least one male in 
earning age, the family must shoot for two sons, that is, four children in the mean. 
In a system where mechanisms external to the family do not provide old-age benefits , 
children are the only insurance for old age. Clearly, and the fact usually is not stressed 
enough, mechanisms for social security can be internal or external to the family but 
require children in both cases. With external mechanisms, as in the welfare state, the 
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children in the system become a "common." As extensively analyzed by socioecologists, 
this commons can suffer a tragedy if everyone takes away and nobody restores the re-
sources. In fact, Western countries currently do not have enough children for ensuring 
the pension system, a point to which we return . 
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Fig. 5. Crude birth and death rates, Finland, 1722-1993. Birth and death rates have fallen by a 
factor of 4 since the 18th century. The fluctuations from the mean also have decreased drastically. Sources 
of data: Lutz (171 and United Nations (241. 
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In short, the fertility situation is very confused, much more than transpires from 
the short considerations just outlined, and up to now fertility has escaped all model 
d,escriptions [33, 34]. Demographic books continue to be littered with puzzling charts 
and lists of numbers [35]. The UN projections of fertility express hopes for the future 
but no consistent view of mechanisms or continuity with the past (Figure 6). However, 
encouraged by our success in describing the evolution of life expectancy during the last 
two centuries, we believe that our logistic model deserves a chance. 
Concerning the strategy of attack, the guidelines are simple: 
1. Concentrate on age-specific fertility rates (number of children produced by 1,000 
women of a given age cohort) to avoid the complexities of age structure in a 
given population and on total fertility rates (the average number of children per 
woman per lifetime).4 
2. Spread the fertility rate analysis over countries of different cultural background 
and economic status. 
3. Also look at the male side of the problem. Fertility rates are usually seen from 
the side of the female, but sometimes statistics also are available on birth rates 
according to age of the father. 
4. Look at the hierarchical position of children according to birth order in different 
contexts in time and culture. Most women in Europe (and Japan) have only 
one child. The concerns about population stability move in opposite directions 
depending on the probability of multiple births. 
' Measuring fertility inside cohorts rather than against the whole population avoids the problem of the age 
structure of the population. Integrating fertility over age, as we do , gives a conceptual structure at a given time. 
However , fertility of cohorts can change in time, so that this number cannot be applied to a given woman (or 
1,000 of them) to forecast their longitudinal fertility. The same model as for fertility rates can be applied to 
the age of mother or father at the birth of children, but the results are not directly comparable, because in the 
case of the rates all women in a certain age cohort are counted. In the case of age at birth (father or mother) , 
only the ones having children are counted. Depending on country and period, about I0"7o to 20% of women 
have no children. Consequently, the integration of fertilit y rates leads to lower values than integrating cumulative 
births (father or mother) . 
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5. Model the fertility transition per se, that is, phenomenologically, without theoreti-
cal (and emotional) constraints. Theory should adapt to facts. 
6. Keep an eye on social moods . Because making children is deep, it will inevitably 
be moody. (The annual birth peak in late winter, reflecting increased conception 
in the spring and early summer, shows mood [36].) 
As a reference case, we fit first the fertility data for Finland, a country with unusually 
good long records. Figure 7 reports the results for the time course of the total fertility 
(average number of children per female per lifetime). That course appears well approxi-
mated by a standard three-parameter logistic inserted between an early, rugged high 
plateau and a current low one. The year 1926 marks the midpoint of the logistic transition. 
Finland moved from a fertility rate of 4.95 in 1890 (990Jo of the upper limit) to a rate 
of 1.55 in 1962 (1 OJo above the lower limit). The characteristic duration is 36 years. 
On this secular evolution of total fertility rate, we find superposed a short pulse of 
extra fertility, as appears in Figure 7. Colloquially, it looks like the outcrop of the "baby 
boom." This transient we analyze separately, integrating it in time. It also reduces to a 
logistic. The pulse centers in 1953, as seen in Figure 8. With the "baby boom" perturbation, 
we have described completely 200 years of total fertility in Finland. The model seems 
to work. 
Now let us start our digging into the inner logic of fertility with a relation taken as 
extremely important as a causative agent in the present reduction of fertility in Western 
countries: fertility versus mortality. Many convoluted discussions exist on how and why 
one lags the other in the "demographic transition" from high to low death and birth rates. 
Comparing the evolution of fertility with that of mortality requires some reflections. 
Mortality is usually fairly selective, hitting mostly children and old people. If we take 
total mortality, it mixes the two phenomena, which differ in psychological impact. We 
do not think reasonable a feedback process where female fertility is inhibited because 
octogenarians overcrowd the area. Certainly fertility in terms of population is diminished 
because of the dilution by infertile people. But, in terms of total fertility rates this dilution 
will not appear because the calculations refer to age cohorts of fertile females only. 
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In fact, our Finnish case also provides a comment on the possible mortality-fertility 
relation. As the "baby boom" fit appears good, we dare to backcast where the signals 
(good data) disappear in the noise of the recession and war years. In Figure 8 we then 
see that 1 OJo of the phenomenon existed in 1929 (1953 minus 24 years). The situation for 
the world then was more bust than boom. It would be curious to explain the pulse as a 
compensation for the mortality of the war, if it began a decade before the war. 
A narrower argument in the current literature is that when females see their children 
do not die, they make fewer. In 1800 in Europe one child out of four would die in the 
first years of life. Taking the reasoning ad litteram for Finland, compensation would 
occur in relation to a fertility in terms of survivors of 4.95 x 0. 75 = 3. 71 . Total fertility 
in Finland in 1993 was 1.55, only 42% of the 3.71 we might now expect if this explanation 
sufficed. Certainly perceived values (e.g. , of child survival) may differ from statistical 
ones, but other demographic examples show that people tend to perceive precisely, at 
least in the means. 
Perhaps we can learn by looking at the secular evolution of infant mortality across 
cultures. Norway, analyzed logistically in Figure 9, shows that the model works again 
and that the reduction has a midpoint in 1920 and a characteristic duration of 115 years. 
France and Italy (not shown) have the same midpoint and characteristic durations of 88 
and 110 years, respectively. 
Returning to the Finnish case (Figure 10), when we compare the fitted logistics on 
fertility and infant mortality, we see similar midpoints, 1926 versus 1916, but very different 
root points (defined as 1 OJo of the process), 1890 versus 1799. This temporal gap does 
not disprove a cause-and-effect mechanism, but it certainly weakens the argument. One 
must explain a delay of a century in setting up the process of reducing births. 
Part of the explanation could be biased reporting. Clearly, fertility rate statistics 
can be falsified. Even in modern Europe, infanticide at birth was widely practiced, with 
no registration of the newborn if the decision had been taken to kill [37] . 
In our opinion, anthropologists Marvin Harris and Eric Ross [38] offer the key to 
the problem (see also [39] for an economist's formalization) . Looking at reproductive 
control in historical perspective, Harris and Ross show that people always had the tools . 
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In other words, family planning always existed, as the decision to have or keep a child 
was taken inside the family. In the analysis of Harris and Ross, this planning tends to 
have an economic arriere pensee: are children a burden or an asset? Both, naturally. But 
the burden tends to fall on the female, and the asset accrues to the family as a whole. 
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In agricultural societies children are a clear plus. They become useful already about 
age 4. They run errands in place of adults, bringing food and messages to people working 
in the fields. They care for little stables, growing, for example, rabbits for the family. 
All at very little extra cost for the parents. The family systematically exploits youngsters 
until they marry and later if they remain in the patriarchal house. Old people run the 
system. They have, perhaps, the experience and, certainly, the authority to do so. The 
elders find in their command both social position and material support. 
The patriarchal family was a welfare organization, perhaps more efficient and effec-
tive than the welfare state. A counterproof of this point of view is the presence of large 
families in proto-industrial English cities. In the words of Harris and Ross [38, 100], "A 
more plausible explanation for the early decline in mortality, which was most dramatic 
among infants, is that it was produced by a relaxation of infant mortality controls and 
by more careful nurturance in response to a new balance of child-rearing costs and benefits 
brought on by the shift to wage labor and industrial employment." 
With the expansion of factories, shops, mines, mills, transport, and other industrial 
capitalist enterprises, wage labor opportunities for children increased. Children became 
relatively more valuable, and infanticide, direct and indirect, yielded-though never en-
tirely-to more positive nurturance. 
This insight may resolve a paradox at the heart of demographic transition theory: that 
Europe experienced an explosive rise in population precisely at a time when, demographers 
have argued, Europeans were beginning consciously to control their fertility. What was 
new were the emergent material conditions, in particular, the magnitude of the incentive 
that industrial capitalism in the late 18th-and early 19th centuries presented for the alter-
ation of behaviors that had heightened the risk of infant and child mortality. 
This is not to say that the overall living standards of the multi-child family necessarily 
improved, but simply that wage-earner parents who reared more children were better off 
than those who reared fewer children under the existing conditions. Indeed, for the 
children themselves life was likely more "mean and brutish" than ever. Children were 
commonly fed at near starvation level until such time as it was necessary to fatten them 
up to go out and seek work. Descriptions in Victorian fiction abound. Charlotte Bronte's 
Jane Eyre and Charles Dickens' Nicholas Nickleby contain well-known examples. 
The relaxation of infant mortality controls could manifest itself in the statistics. A 
diminution of direct and indirect infanticide is likely to show in demographic tables not 
only as a decrease in mortality but also as an increase in fertility . Live births previously 
regarded as spontaneous abortions or stillborn and never registered would, under a more 
nurturant behavioral regime, be registered as live births and distort the rate of fertility 
change in an upward direction. We have now reported Indian and European cases for 
pegging the "wanted children" number to a well-defined value. Harris and Ross [38] give 
examples since antiquity. 
The "pill," although scientifically made and certainly more reliable, did not introduce 
an essential discontinuity in birth control. Many types of contraceptives always existed 
in the form of vegetables and seeds that contained hormone mimics [40]. The Greeks 
and Romans, for example, extensively used a plant similar to fennel as an anticoncep-
tional. The plant grew wild in Libya. To stress its commercial value, the Romans minted 
its image on coins, so that the plant can be exactly identified. Significantly, it was harvested 
to extinction. 
Assuming that economic considerations prevail, lei us now look at the present situa-
tion in developed countries. All of them are in a phase of low fertility. The current 
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wisdom assumes that wealth is an opportunity for selfishness where personal pleasure is 
put before the toils of rearing children. 
Historically, even in periods of high fertility, the wealthy have had few children. 
This argument often pops up, helped by the argument of feminist power and female 
careers. Clearly, in a well-off family children are not assets. They are costly to grow and 
educate at the appropriate standard. They bring no income when they are young. They 
are unnecessary for the support of their aging but still wealthy parents. If static property 
such as land forms the wealth, many children would inevitably split it. These trivial 
reasons neatly explain the premodern demographic practices of the rich. Fertility control 
has never been a real problem, although infanticide would have been more complicated 
in a wealthy environment. 
Nowadays wealth at large is linked more to financial assets than to static property, 
but child costs still can be described the same way. Nurturing the oldies is left to third 
parties financed by the income or assets of the old people. In this situation of no economic 
incentive, only one basic reproductive instinct remains, that of continuity. Adults beyond 
reproductive age who realize that there is nothing after them rage and despair . Their 
genes will disappear. Metaphorically, the rocket went into space without a payload. 
Assuming that the basic instinct for continuity is finally stronger than bare economic 
considerations, then every couple may long for a child. With the very low level of child 
mortality at present (around 1 % ), one child should be enough. But here another argument, 
or instinct, comes in. The child should be male. If we put biological mechanisms in 
control, this request makes sense, as otherwise the Y gene would be lost. 
It is difficult to demonstrate that the cultural biases leading to the same conclusion 
are an externalizatio6. of the basic instinct under folkloric disguise. However, suppose 
couples reproduce starting with the idea of the boy. 50 percent of them, or a few more, 
get one. The other half get a girl and a dilemma: what to do next. We may assume that 
they decide on a second try. The last, if unsuccessful. 
With this strategy in mind, and taking into account that about 150Jo of the females 
never give birth for various reasons, we find a reproduction rate of about 1.3 per female, 
almost exactly the present reproduction rate in European countries.i If our reasoning is 
correct, their situation is unlikely to change, because of a lack of driving forces in the 
short term. 
On the other hand, the potential exists for further decline, because modern techniques 
permit the determination of the sex of the fetus at an early age. Such potential is realized 
already, for example in India, where, as described, two males per family are in request. 
Ninety-nine percent of the abortions following sex determination in India are females. 
(One study of 8,000 cases of abortion in India showed 7997 female fetuses [41].) This 
excess female "mortality" has been a historically omnipresent phenomenon. In China 
19th-century surveys report male-female childhood sex ratios up to 4 to l as late as the 
1870s [42]. Prostitution obviously flourished, and concubines' flagged status. 
In Western countries, the economic detachment of parents from children may bring 
another scenario and perhaps set restoring forces into action. A population with a total 
reproductive rate of 1.3 per female is unstable and converges to very small numbers in 
a few generations. Children are decoupled from the family, but they are still coupled to 
society because, collectively, they must earn the pensions paid to old-timers. 
'If, 150Jo of females have no children, 430Jo of females have a boy, and 420Jo have two kids, the total fertility 
rate is equal to 1.27. 
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Fig. 11. Total fertility rate, Sweden, 1900-1993. Sources of data: Conseil de !'Europe [15) and United 
Nations (24). 
As suggested, shrinking the total number of children will wreck the pension system, 
bringing a feedback signal already strong after two generations, well ahead of the shrink-
ing to zero of the total population [43] . History shows such reasoning to be correct. We 
; eport one case in which the same social context, land, and population under different 
laws produce different, and predictable, results. 
Before the French Revolution, primogeniture determined the inheritance of land. 
The eldest child inherited all. The 1789 revolution brought the abolition of the rights 
of the eldest child in 1790-1791. Equal partition followed under the Napoleonic code. 
Consequently, fertility shrank to the point of producing only one son per family. The 
loss of inheritance by splitting would mean a loss of liberty and downward social mobility . 
The only lever left to the family than was to reduce the number of offspring, and they 
used it. Pierre Le Play, the 19th-century developer of the social survey, observed that 
the Ancien Regime produced the eldest son, whereas the new produced the only son [44]. 
When opportunity knocks , the rich may also procreate profusely. Royal families 
provide a typical case. They use children to consolidate power by putting them into the 
administration and the army and to penetrate external territories via marriages . Empress 
Maria Theresia, a career woman with heavy duties had, nevertheless, 17 children. Her 
Habsburg family actively procreated for 1,000 years, perhaps one of the roots of its 
continuing power. They still appear now as a big bunch, and they might come back, as 
adumbrated by the recent proposal to Otto to become king of Hungary. 
Conversely, civilizations have simply melted away because of poor reproductive rates 
of the dominant class . We should not forget that the white man's supremacy started with 
a reproductive stir in Europe during the last part of the first millennium and continued 
with ups and downs until the end of the 19th century. The question may be whether 
underneath the personal decision to procreate lies a subliminal social mood influencing 
the process, as endorphins do. The fact that crude birth rates in Austria jumped up by 
60% in 1939, the year after the German annexation, may not be pure chance. The sublimi-
nal mood of the Europeans could now be for a blackout after 1,000 years on stage. 
Sweden counters the trend to the lowering (to 1.3) of the total fertility in Europe. 
Swedes, after a decrease from a value of 2.5 in 1964 to 1.6 in 1977, started a rise in 1983, 
bringing the value back to 2.0 in 1992 (Figure 11 ). Examining the phenomenology of 
this change by fine analysis of fertility pattern would be useful. 
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Logistic equations have successfully described the growth of an individual and the 
evolution of the vis vita/is in integral form, counting, for example, the publications of 
a scientist or the works of an artist [45). Thus, it is natural, heuristically, to try them 
on fertility versus age. Children are a form of DNA publication, after all. Fertility statistics 
include reports of female fertility as a function of age, usually in blocks of 5 years. 
Fathers are not neglected; births according to the age of the father are sometimes available. 
Figure 12 shows the result for Finland at intervals from 1776 to 1976. When we 
think of all the whimsical forces presiding over reproduction, the fitting appears excellent. 
The first datum is usually low with respect to the fitted curve, a general characteristic of 
the fitting of vis vita/is interpretable to mean that the young have the drive but not yet 
the tools (for the artist). In the case of young girls, society constrains. But, in short 
order, the lost activity is made up, and the second point is perfectly in line. 
Our frugal condensation of the characteristics of fertility into a few numbers makes 
quantitative comparisons convenient. We can, for example, compare the fertility rates 
over time. Comparison shows that the reproductive activity concentrates in younger and 
younger years, the midpoints moving from 30 to 31 years old in 1776-1926 and to 26 
in 1976. The characteristic duration of the process shortens from 20 years to 14. The 
time structure remains, as the profile of the histograms in Figure 12 basically stays the 
same. In accounting terms, clearly children of higher rank (n + 1) are falling off. The 
perfect self-consistency shows that the planning, if subliminal, precedes the accident (e.g., 
an abortion). 
This analysis also makes comparison sharp for different cultures, and certainly the 
biological dictates are cross-cultural. In Egypt (Figure 13) a woman now produces the 
number of children more or less that a Finnish woman did 100 years ago. We find an 
analogous distribution in time, as the Egyptian midpoint is 30 years (as for Finland to 
the 1920s), and the characteristic duration is 18 years (vs. 19). One might think that the 
preset number of children determines the time pattern of pregnancies. 
We can zoom into further detail, such as the distribution in time of deliveries ac-
cording to the sequence of children (first, second, etc .), for example, for Canadian females 
(Figure 14). The time structure in the production of the first child is basically identical 
to that of the following ones. The distance between the child waves is about 2.5 years (the 
numbers for the midpoints are rounded). Such Prussian order was certainly unexpected in 
such amateurish activity. The probability for a third Canadian child falls off rapidly. 
Very ordered, if not in a Prussian row, are also Malawi women (Figure 15), who 
seem to shoot in faster and faster flashes. Probabilities decrease very slowly for successive 
children, and so Malawi grows rapidly. Only the first four children are analyzed in Figure 
15, but the total nears seven (Figure 16). The pattern may resemble that of Finland around 
1700. The physical fertility span seems busy all over. The characteristic duration is longer 
for Malawi women. 
Speaking of time constants, at the other extreme we find Japan, where the characteris-
tic duration of the age-specific fertility rate is only 9 years, meaning that all the children 
are produced near the midpoint, 27 years (Figure 17). The number is only 1.6 per female. 
These few examples, extracted from a large portfolio, do not show any special feature 
that characterizes female fertility in a way that permits the forecast of the fertility of a 
certain group. Obviously the fertile period expands or contracts to accommodate more 
or fewer children. The central point does not move much away from 28 years. The 
consistency of the process impresses, as if the decision to produce n children were taken 
before starting. Recall that the statistics are longitudinalized, that is, taken at a certain 
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for a description of the method of analysis used here. Source of data: United Nations (23). 
date for women of various age brackets . The integration assumes that data refer to a 
certain cohort (by date of birth) observed along its life span. 
The total fertile period for women is about 35 years. For the few places where 
statistics are available, it is interesting to integrate for a given actual cohort across years 
of large fertility change to see whether the presumed family plan is kept across the change. 
We perform the experiment for Finnish women, for whom we know 1926 was the peak 
year of change in fertility rates. (Long time-series data on cohort fertility are also available 
for France and several other European countries [15].) We take cohorts born in the 
periods 1881-1885 and 1921-1925 with midpoints around 1914 and 1952. We need to 
keep in mind the reproductive doldrums circa 1930. 
Figure 18 compares the cohort and period fertility rates in Finland and shows that 
the actual cohorts do experience the lower fertility into which they will grow. We might 
interpret this to indicate that the women in some way anticipate the future trend or that 
the trend of the time when they were around the center point had a dominant effect on 
their behavior, and the tails were somehow adjusted. 
Let us check the symmetric case of male fertility . For animals, including humans, 
the female obviously makes the biological decision, but the male behavior might mirror 
the decisions in a revealing way. Figure 19 reports male fertility (age of father when a 
legitimate child is born) for Egypt. Here we see a curious phenomenon involving two 
logistics, or "bilogistic growth" [46]. A first wave of procreation, similar to that of a 
female, generates most children. Then a second wave follows, at a midpoint distance of 
about 15 years, as the aging father has a second pulse of procreation (midpoint 47 years) 
with about one-fourth of the children of the first. One might think that in predominantly 
Moslem Egypt, men, having attained with age a certain economic success, refresh their 
harems. But the same phenomenon also appears in Canada, a country of very mixed 
religion (Figure 20). The midpoint distance between the spurts is less than in Egypt, 11 
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3 for a description of the method of analysis used. Source of data: United Nations (23]. 
years, and the size of the second spurt is only about one-tenth of the first. Divorce, 
common in countries such as Canada, permits longitudinal polygamy, and consequently 
the final result may be the same. Canadian men reach 90 percent of their second wave 
of fathering by 45 , whereas Egyptian men take until 55. 
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In a nutshell, high fertility appears to be the effect of protracted fertility, both for 
male and female. Simple observation makes this conclusion fairly obvious, but here we 
report it in crisp mathematics that may help the next step in conceptualization. More 
generally, we have seen that many individual demographic processes are well modeled 
by the logistic. Although interesting per se, the analysis of fertility does not give clues 
for the future. For example, our historical analysis of Finnish women (Figure 7) shows 
the transient but carries no logic to foresee or negate a new transient either up or down. 
Notwithstanding the considerable success in the morphology of fertility, the assembly 
of the mechanisms that enable population forecasts from the bottom up has yet to come. 
Modeling the Niche 
Alternatively, forecasts of population may be made by methods that look at the 
aggregate numbers and neglect the mechanisms. After all, animal societies growing in a 
given niche have numerical dynamics neatly fitted by logistic equations with constant 
limit K. The idea originated in Europe in the middle of last century and reached its 
maximum splendor in the United States in the 1920s with the work of Pearl, Reed, and 
Lotka (reproduced in [47]; see also [48]) . Putnam resumed this work after World War 
II [49]. His brilliant recapitulation remains worth attentive reading. 
What these investigators found is that logistics usually fit well the growth of a human 
population for a while, but then often problems come. The mathematicians and statisti-
cians who looked into the problems tried to solve them with the tool they were most 
familiar with : mathematics. They invented "generalized" logistics of various descriptions 
and increasing complication, until it was no longer worthwhile to do with these logistics 
what could be done with polynomials [12]. In any case, the capacity to predict eluded 
the analysts. 
The reason why the logistics work well with most animal populations is that the 
niches that encase the populations are of constant size. When the animals can invent 
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Fig. 21. The population of England fit with a bilogistic growth curve, 1541-1975. The sum of two 
logistics is used to analyze the population history of England. The first logistic curve has a 132-year 
characteristic growth time and a limit of 5 million and is centered in 1540. The second has a characteristic 
growth time of 166 years and a limit of 48 million and is centered in 1892. See Meyer [46) for a description 
of the bilogistic model . Sources of data: Wrigley [28) and Flora [46). 
new technologies, such as when bacteria produce a new enzyme to dismantle a sleepy 
component of their broth, then we face a problem. New logistics suddenly pop up, either 
growing from the limit of the prior one or, if the invention came early, in the course of 
the first logistic. 
This expansion of the niche happens with humans. In fact, homo Jaber keeps in-
venting all the time, so that logistics have fleeting limits . To give an example, if we take 
the "industrial revolution" as one very large innovation (embracing the changes discussed 
earlier in mortality and fertility), we can reconceive the population history of England 
as a sum of two logistics, or bilogistic, with the first limit set by medieval technology at 
5 million and the second limit rising to accommodate 48 million more in the modern era 
[46] (Figure 21). Japan, which was largely impervious to Western technology under the 
Tokugawa Shogunate and then absorbed it eagerly under the Meiji beginning in the 
1860s, provides an even cleaner example with an addition of 103 million to a base of 33 
(Figure 22). 
Abandoning restraint, we have also mapped the growth of the U.S. population with 
a sum of overlapping logistics keyed to long cycles of economic expansion (Figure 23) . 
The fit is not bad, but equally good alternative fits exist, and interpretation is fuzzy . As 
with forecasting fertility, the method does not say what will come next. One trick we 
can try, which has worked post-mortem in other analyses, is to envelop the sum of logistics 
in a "superlogistic" constructed by taking as base points the centerpoints of the single 
logistics, loaded with the values of the respective limits. We bring the masses into the 
gravity centers, so to speak. The result for the United States, shown in the inset of Figure 
23 , is that the population grows to a limit of around 390 million roughly in 2100. The 
midpoint is around 1940 when the United States became world power #1. All the figures 
appear plausible, but the exercise is acrobatic. 
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Fig. 22. The population of Japan fit with a bilogistic growth curve, 1100-1992. The sum of two 
logistics is used to analyze the population history of Japan. Adding on to an earlier base population of 
5 million is a logistic with a 516-year characteristic growth time and a limit of 28 million centered in 
1537. A second logistic curve with a 95-year characteristic growth time and a limit of 103 million centered 
in 1950 is added. See Meyer (46) for a description of the bilogistic model. Sources of data: Taeuber [21) 
and Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society [22). 
On niche approaches, we might summarize by saying that so far no one has built 
a solid structure capable of propelling itself into the future. As the case of the growth 
of the population of the United States shows, just fitting equations provides no roots to 
keep the results standing. However, we cannot help but be impressed by the factors of 
increase between apparent population limits, 10 in England and 4 in Japan. 
Conclusions 
The revival of the logistic brings substantial progress in the modeling of the evolution 
of life expectancy and of fertility versus age. Life expectancy grows at all ages, with 
different rates, according to a logistic path. In looking at the limits of these logistics, 
when no more gain should be expected, we find convergent paths. Thus, mortality all 
along the life span will be reduced to small numbers and mortality concentrated toward 
the end. Death comes through senility, and the mean age of death, when the limit of 
our logistic life span occurs, can be defined as longevity. For Europeans (and probably 
everyone eventually), it is about 80 years for men and 85 for women. 
The longevity "pill" could come with genetic engineering, but in any case we doubt 
it will be demographically important until after, say, 2050. Its diffusion will be limited 
by experimentation and investigation of its effects. Although life expectancy above 50 
years of age greatly affects social organization, its change has only transitory effect on 
total population numbers. 
Fertility dynamics also follow logistic paths. The retrospective analysis of fertility 
(and mortality) afforded by the logistic undermines several popular arguments in demo-
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graphic theory. It supports the view that fertility has always been under cultural control 
and that family plans, beyond one son, are essentially economic. In the absence of fears 
about the future of social security or other conceptional stimuli (or massive immigration), 
the populations of the advanced industrialized nations will slowly implode. Admitting 
such "ifs," we have not solved the problem of modeling total fertility in the future, on 
which prediction of the population as a whole depends. 
However, the logistic can offer a consistent approach for predicting values for vari-
ables in demographic models, including those that take into account the changing age 
structure of a population, provided the logistic character of the process is reasonably 
established and no "new logistic" arises . These values are logically superior to the guesses 
now incorporated into many models. 
With respect to niche approaches, logistic analysis at least formally and quantitatively 
defines the problem of limits. The growth of human populations demonstrates the elastic-
ity of the human niche, determined largely by technology. For the homo Jaber, the limits 
to numbers keep shifting, in the English case by a factor of 10 in less than two centuries. 
In the long run, these moving edges probably most confound forecasting the size of hu-
manity. 
We are grateful to Thomas Buettner, Joel Cohen, and Paul Waggoner for assistance. 
Appendix 1: The Logistic Model 
This appendix defines the logistic model and the terms we use for demographic 
analysis. The logistic model assumes that the early growth of a population (or other 
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variable) N(t) increases exponentially with a growth rate constant a.. As the population 
N(t) approaches a limit K, the growth rate [dN(t)]ldt slows, producing the characteristic 
S-shaped curve. The mechanisms that cause this slowing depend on characteristics of 
the population or system being modeled, but empirical studies have shown that this 
slowing is present in many growth and diffusion processes. Thus, the logistic is a useful 
generic model for both systems where the mechanisms are understood and where the 
mechanisms might be hidden. 
The continuous nonlinear ordinary differential equation that describes this growth 
process is: 
dN(t) = a.N(t) (t _ N(t)) 
dt 1( 
(1) 
For the analytic form we need a third parameter, tm, which specifies the midpoint of the 
sigmoidal curve and is related to the initial population N0(t) by 
tm = .!.1n(~ - 1). 
a. No(t) 
We also replace a. with !1t, the characteristic duration, that is, the time it takes the 
population N(t) to grow from 10% to 90% of the limit K. !1t is related to a. by M = 
ln81/a.. The analytic form of this differential equation, with our parameterization, is: 
1( 
N(t) = [- ln(81)(t _ tm)] 1 +exp M 
(2) 
It also is possible to define a change of variables that allows a normalized logistic to be 
plotted as a straight line (often known as the Fisher-Pry Transform): 
F(t) = N(t), 5'<P(t) = ( F(t) ) 
K I - F(t) 
If 5'<P is plotted on a logarithmic scale, the S-shaped logistic is rendered linear and the 
period between 10- 2 and 102 equals !1t. The 5'<P transform also allows more than one 
logistic to be shown on the same graph with the same scale, as each curve is normalized 
to the limit K. 
Literally thousands of examples of the dynamics of populations and other growth 
processes have been well modeled by the simple logistic. Classic examples include the 
cumulative growth of a child's vocabulary and the adoption of hybrid corn by Iowa 
farmers. The excellent fits obtained are a major reason for our preference for the logistic. 
Another advantage of our formulation of the model is that its parameters have clear, 
physical interpretations. In addition, recent studies have shown that the simple logistic 
often outperforms more complicated parameterizations, which have the disadvantage of 
losing clear physical interpretations for their parameters (50]. 
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms 
Fertility: The childbearing performance of individuals, couples, groups, or populations. 
General fertility rate (GFR): The ratio of the number of live births in a specified period 
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Age Group 
16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
Source: United Nations [23] . 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
FERTILITY IN EGYPT IN 1982 
ASFR 
C. MARCHETTI ET AL. 
(per 1,000 women 
per age group) 
31.0 
173 .9 
308.6 
258 .7 
177.8 
69.3 
35.9 
(often 1 year) to the average number of women of childbearing age (usually taken 
as age 15-49) in the population during the period. For example, the U.S. GFR for 
1990 was 31.8 births per 1,000 women age 15-49 per year [24]. 
Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR): The number of live births occurring to women of a 
particular age or age group per year, normally expressed per 1,000 women. For 
example, the ASFR for U.S. women age 20-24 was 122.1 births per 1,000 women 
in 1990 [24]. 
Total fertility rate (TFR): The TFR can be interpreted as the number of children a woman 
would have during her lifetime if she were to experience the fertility rates of the 
period at each age. The TFR is obtained by summing the age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFR) over the whole range of reproductive ages for a particular period (usually 
1 year). Although one of the most frequently quoted measures of fertility, the TFR 
sometimes requires a certain caution in interpretation. It is a hypothetical measure, 
not necessarily applicable to any true cohort, and may be of dubious value when 
the level or timing of fertility are changing. A TFR of 2.1 is a widely cited benchmark 
for a stable population. The U.S. TFR for 1990 was 1.92 births per woman, the 
world average in 1990 was 3.45. Africa averaged the highest TFR in 1990 at 6.24 [24]. 
Cumulative age-specific fertility rate: This rate is equivalent to the total fertility rate. As 
stated in the definition for TFR, the TFR is the sum of the Age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFR) over the whole range of reproductive ages . An example will make this clearer. 
Egypt in 1982 had an ASFR distribution as shown in Appendix Table 1. 
Because there are 5 years per age group, the sum of the ASFR values in the 
table (1,055 .2) multiplied by 5 gives the TFR in births per 1,000 women (5,276 births 
per 1,000 woman per lifetime). It is customary to give the TFR in births per woman, 
in this case approximately 5.3 births per woman per lifetime. Thus, the Cumulative 
ASFR divided by 200 equals the TFR. 
Notice that the distribution of the ASFR, when plotted as a histogram, approxi-
mates a bell-shaped curve. The cumulative sum of a bell-shaped curve is an S-shaped 
curve. Thus, we use the well known S-shaped logistic growth curve to characterize 
the cumulative ASFR of different countries . The three parameters of the logistic 
curve are characteristic duration At, limit - K, and midpoint - tm. The characteristic 
duration At is the length of time needed for the curve to grow from 10% to 900/o 
of the limit, which in this case roughly translates to the length of the childbearing 
process for a given ASFR distribution. The limit K is equivalent to the TFR, and 
the midpoint tm, the center of the curve. 
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Appendix Fig. 1. Comparison of age-specific fertility rate data, Thailand. Left: Data from the Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (OHS). Right: UN data reported for the same year. Sources of data: United 
Nations (25) and Muhuri et al. (19). 
Age-specific fertility rate by birth order (ASFR): Very rarely, the ASFR of a population 
is broken down by birth order. For example, in Egypt in 1982, women age 20-24 
had 173.9 births per 1,000 women. Of those births, 56.7/1,000 were from women 
having their first child, 68.0/ 1,000 were from women having their second child, and 
so on [23). 
Crude birth rate: The ratio of live births in a specified period (usually 1 year) to the 
average population (normally mid-year population) in that period, usually in births 
per 1,000 persons. Varies from 10 per 1,000 in developed countries to 60 per 1,000 
in the developing countries. The U.S. crude birth rate for 1990 was 16 per 1,000 
persons [24). 
Crude death rate: The ratio of deaths in a year to the population, usually given in deaths 
per 1,000 persons. The crude death rate (also called simply the death rate) is strongly 
influenced by the age-sex structure of a population. The lowest death rates are to 
be expected in rapidly growing or youthful populations with a high life expectancy. 
For example, Singapore in 1980 had a death rate of 5 per 1,000, whereas the U.S. 
death rate for 1980 was 8.6 per 1,000 [24]. In historical times, the crude death rate 
might have been as high as 30-40 per 1,000, with crises years reaching rates twice 
as high. 
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Mortality: The process whereby deaths occur in a population. 
Infant mortality rate: The ratio of the number of deaths during a specific period (usually 
1 year) of live-born infants who have not reached their first birthday to the number 
of live births in the period. It is usually given in deaths per 1,000 live births. The 
infant mortality rate for the United States in 1990 was 10 deaths per 1,000 live 
births [24]. 
Life expectancy: The average number of additional years a person would live if the 
mortality conditions used in the calculation remain valid. Usually given as life expec-
tancy at birth, which can vary from 80 + years for females in the developed countries 
to 40 to 50 years in the developing countries. Sometimes given as life expectancy at 
age X, which gives the average additional number of years a person at age X can 
be expected to live. 
Appendix 3: Note on the Problems with Fertility Data 
A major obstacle to accurate demographic modeling is uncertainty in the available 
data, especially for the developing countries. In countries where births and deaths are 
not recorded, it is hard to construct accurate population estimates and even harder to 
reconstruct age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) data needed for accurate population model-
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Appendix Fig. 2. Comparison of age-specific fertility rate data, Tunisia. Left: Data from the Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (OHS). Right: UN data reported for the same year. Sources of data: United 
Nations (25) and Muhuri et al. (19]. 
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ing. For these countries, a few widely quoted publications contain data derived from 
different sources. 
The United Nations Demographic Yearbooks contain data collected from the na-
tional statistics offices of the member countries. For countries with good national statistics 
agencies, the data are accurate, but for the others the data can be unreliable. For example, 
some countries' statistics agencies might, for political or social reasons, underreport the 
data on various subpopulations. For this reason, the United Nations World Population 
Prospects projections do not rely exclusively on the data provided by the national statistics 
agencies, but supplement them with data from independent surveys conducted by academ-
ics, other national or international nongovernmental agencies, or the World Bank. An-
other source of data is the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) project run by the 
Institute for Resource Development, Inc., Columbia, Maryl_and. The main objective of 
this 9-year project is to "advance survey methodologies [in the developing countries] and 
to aid in the development of the skills necessary to conduct demographic and health 
surveys." The data for the participating countries are considered reliable. 
To illustrate the uncertainty in fertility data, Appendix Figure 1 and Appendix Figure 
2 show comparisons between the ASFR data on Thailand and Tunisia from the United 
Nations Demographic Yearbook (national statistics) and the DHS surveys. In the case 
of Thailand, the estimated total fertility rate is either 2.34 births per woman or 1.85, 
the former being above and the latter below replacement level. The data for Tunisia also 
differ by one child per woman. Uncertainty of this magnitude could signific<tntly bias 
population projections. Clearly, better data are necessary for accurate population 
modeling. 
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